Second person thought

Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331 (2014)

Authors
Jane Heal
Cambridge University
Abstract
There are modes of presentation of a person in thought corresponding to the first and third person pronouns. This paper proposes that there is also thought involving a second person mode of presentation of another, which might be expressed by an utterance involving ‘you’, but need not be expressed linguistically. It suggests that co-operative activity is the locus for such thought. First person thought is distinctive in how it supplies reasons for the subject to act. In co-operative action there is first person plural intending and judging. So there is a way of thinking of another, when openly co-operating with him or her, which plays the distinctive role of giving reason for contribution to the co-operative activity. In slogan form, ‘you’ is ‘we minus I’. The way children learn to use second and third person pronouns is naturally explained on this view. Contrasting less sophisticated kinds of co-operative activity with more sophisticated forms, and considering some issues about common knowledge and commo..
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2014.941911
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Self-Consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2007 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
Thinking About You.Léa Salje - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):817-840.
Thinking About You.Léa Salje - 2016 - Mind:fzw018.
You Me and the World.Naomi Eilan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):311-324.

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