Truthmaking and the alleged need for relevance
Logique and Analyse 46 (183-184):345-364 (2003)
Since 1969, when Bas van Fraassen wrote 'Facts and Tautological Entailments', it has been assumed that if facts, or states of affairs, exist at all, they can only play the role of truthmakers for propositions if the truthmaker relation is defined in a relevantist revision of classical logic. Greg Restall revived this notion in 1996, and it has since been discussed positively by Stephen Read. I argue in this paper that this was always a mistake. The truthmaking relation between facts and propositions can indeed be made sense of-but no relevantist revision of classical logic is required. The correspondence theory of truth can thus be shown to have been essentially correct all along.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
Truthmaking, Evidence Of, and Impossibility Proofs.Adrian Heathcote - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):363-375.
The Truthmaker Account Is Not a Causal Theory.Adrian Heathcote - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):383-388.
Similar books and articles
Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology.Frank Hofmann - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):409-440.
Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers.Jamin Asay - 2011 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.Jamin Asay - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Truthmaking: A Cognition-Independent Internal Relation with Heterogeneous Relata.Ingvar Johansson - 2004 - In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 154--56.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-04-03
Total downloads1 ( #890,406 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,698 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?