Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44 (2007)

Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to be defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections.
Keywords Pleasure  Pain  Desire  Motivational theory of pleasure  Hedonism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9004-9
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Action, Emotion And Will.A. Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
The Pleasure of Art.Mohan Matthen - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1):6-28.

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