The Truthmaker Account Is Not a Causal Theory

Acta Analytica 29 (3):383-388 (2014)
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Abstract

It is argued that the part-whole account of the relation between evidence and the larger state of affairs the evidence is evidence of—an account that was elucidated in the paper ‘Truthmaking, Evidence of, and Impossibility Proofs’ —provides a better basis for epistemology than causal relations between events. I apply this to a well-known phenomenon in physics which suggests that causal connectedness is not necessary for knowledge

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Citations of this work

Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):403-417.

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References found in this work

Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gettier and the stopped clock.A. Heathcote - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):309-314.
Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem.Adrian Heathcote - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science. pp. 152--67.
Truthmaking and the alleged need for relevance.Adrian Heathcote - 2003 - Logique and Analyse 46 (183-184):345-364.

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