Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure

Utilitas 30 (2):219-227 (2018)
Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of one’s attitudes.
Keywords pleasure  pain  attitudinal theories of pleasure  desire theories of pleasure  unconscious pleasure
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820817000188
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References found in this work BETA

The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.
Six Theses About Pleasure.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.
Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant?Richard J. Hall - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):643-59.

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