O conceito de imaginação em Wittgenstein

Natureza Humana 5 (2):393-421 (2003)
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Abstract

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que o conceito de imaginação, tal como é concebido pelo mentalismo filosófico ou psicológico, é uma ilusão gramatical que pode ser desfeita pelo regresso ao "solo áspero" da linguagem ordinária.This paper proposes to demonstrate that the concept of imagination, as it is conceived by philosophical or psychological mentalist doctrines, is a grammatical illusion, which can be solved by means of a movement back to the "rough ground" of ordinary language

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