A Note on the Logic of (Higher-Order) Vagueness

Analysis 53 (4):201-208 (1993)
A discussion of Crispin Wright's 'paradox of higher-order vagueness', I suggest that the paradox may be resolved by careful attention to the logical principles used in its formulation. In particular, I focus attention on the rule of inference that allows for the inference from A to 'Definitely A', and argue that this rule, though valid, may not be used in subordinate deductions, e.g., in the course of a conditional proof. Wright's paradox uses the rule (or its equivalent) in this way.
Keywords Vagueness  Wright
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/53.4.201
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,317
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Higher-Order Sorites Paradox.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
The Impossibility of Vagueness.Kit Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
178 ( #29,077 of 2,224,469 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #60,862 of 2,224,469 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature