Consistency and the theory of truth

Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):424-466 (2015)
Authors
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
Abstract
This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: Adding a theory of truth to a finitely axiomatized theory T is more or less equivalent to a kind of abstract consistency statement. A large part of the interest of the paper lies in the way syntactic theories are 'disentangled' from object theories.
Keywords truth  consistency  tarski
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020314000549
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References found in this work BETA

The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
On the Scheme of Induction for Bounded Arithmetic Formulas.A. J. Wilkie & J. B. Paris - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 35 (3):261-302.
Minimal Truth and Interpretability.Martin Fischer - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):799-815.

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Citations of this work BETA

Equivalences for Truth Predicates.Carlo Nicolai - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):322-356.

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