Meaning and truth-conditions: A reply to Kemp

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87 (2002)
Authors
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
Abstract
In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles 'a literal, rather wooden' understanding of truth-conditions. I explore alternatives, and say a few words about how Frege's regress argument might best be understood
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00254
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References found in this work BETA

Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege's Metaphysics of Judgment.Thomas Ricketts - 1986 - In Hintikka J. & Haaparanta L. (eds.), Frege Synthesized. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 65--95.
Truth, Meaning, and Understanding.Scott Soames - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):17-35.
Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):483-493.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
II—Gary Kemp: Hyperintensional Truth Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.
II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.

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Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
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Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.

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