Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition

Authors
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
Abstract
Some years ago, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich reported the results of experiments that reveal, they claim, cross-cultural differences in speaker’s ‘intuitions’ about Kripke’s famous Gödel–Schmidt case. Several authors have suggested, however, that the question they asked their subjects is ambiguous between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Machery and colleagues have since made a number of replies. It is argued here that these are ineffective. The larger lesson, however, concerns the role that first-order philosophy should, and more importantly should not, play in the design of such experiments and in the evaluation of their results.
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-017-0362-3
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References found in this work BETA

Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455-464.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell. pp. 128-159.

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