Synthese 142 (3):317--352 (2005)

Authors
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
Abstract
Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; that the word true, in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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Reprint years 2005
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-005-3719-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):219--61.

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Citations of this work BETA

Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.
A Liar Paradox.Richard Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Beth's Theorem and Deflationism.Timothy Bays - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.
Deflating Logical Consequence.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
What is Quine's View of Truth?Donald Davidson - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):437 – 440.
Truth and Disquotation.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):317 - 352.

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