Truth in Frege

In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Robert May
University of California, Davis
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The Frege Reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Blackwell.
Knowledge of Meaning.Richard Larson & Gabriel Segal - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):960-964.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Theodore de Laguna's Discovery of the Deflationary Theory of Truth.Joel Katzav - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-9.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
550 ( #6,353 of 2,243,716 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #43,009 of 2,243,716 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature