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Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604 (2019)
Abstract
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/phpr.12486
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Citations of this work
The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media: Moral not Epistemic.Elizabeth Edenberg - 2021 - In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford, UK:
The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.
Group Belief for a Reason.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):1-22.
Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.
References found in this work
Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
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