Authors
Remco Heesen
University of Western Australia
Abstract
There is a commonly made distinction between two types of scientists: risk-taking, trailblazing mavericks and detail-oriented followers. A number of recent papers have discussed the question what a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers looks like. Answering this question is most useful if a scientific community can be steered toward such a desirable mixture. One attractive route is through credit incentives: manipulating rewards so that reward-seeking scientists are likely to form the desired mixture of their own accord. Here I argue that this idea is less straightforward than it may seem. Interpreting mavericks as scientists who prioritize rewards over speed and risk, I show in a deliberatively simple model that there is a fixed mixture which is not particularly likely to be desirable and which credit incentives cannot alter. I consider a way around this result, but this has some major drawbacks. I conclude that credit incentives are not as promising a way to create a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers as one might have thought.
Keywords Philosophy of science  Formal epistemology  Social epistemology  Credit economy  Mavericks
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.11.007
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Against Method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Peer Review a Good Idea?Remco Heesen & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):635-663.
Creativity, Conservativeness & the Social Epistemology of Science.Adrian Currie - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 76:1-4.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Role of the Matthew Effect in Science.Michael Strevens - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):159-170.
Taking Credit.William J. Graham & William H. Cooper - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 115 (2):403-425.
Seven Arguments Against Extra Credit.Christopher Pynes - 2014 - Teaching Philosophy 37 (2):191-214.
Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science.Remco Heesen - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):698-716.
Knowledge and Credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Risk Sensitive Credit.Maura Priest - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):703-726.
Credit for Making a Discovery.Nicholas Rescher - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):189-200.
Herding and the Quest for Credit.Michael Strevens - 2013 - Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (1):19 - 34.
Credit‐Default Swaps Are Not to Blame.Peter J. Wallison - 2009 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21 (2-3):377-387.
Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):503-528.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-09-27

Total views
88 ( #123,667 of 2,454,616 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #50,376 of 2,454,616 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes