Philosophical Review 108 (1):115 (1999)

John Heil
Washington University in St. Louis
Despite heroic efforts, philosophers have found it increasingly difficult to evade discussion of metaphysical topics. Take the philosophy of mind. Take, in particular, the mind-body problem in its latest guise: the problem of causal relevance. If mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, how can we reconcile the role such properties seem to have in producing bodily motions that constitute actions with the apparent fact that the very same motions are entirely explicable on the basis of purely physical properties of purely physical events in the nervous system? Familiar approaches to the problem include appeals to “supervenient causation,” to “higher-level” laws governing putatively higher-level entities and events, and to “realizing” relations that make room in objects for overlapping properties.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8108
DOI 10.2307/2998271
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,021
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is There a Fundamental Level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):342-359.
Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
Fundamentality Without Foundations.Michael J. Raven - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):607-626.
Grounding-Mechanical Explanation.Kelly Trogdon - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1289-1309.

View all 125 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs?James D. Rissler - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):193 – 209.
Tensed States of Affairs and Possible Worlds.Quentin Smith - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1):225-235.
Reply to Martin.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):214 – 217.
Truth Breakers.Dale Jacquette - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):153-163.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
What There is, How Things Are.Peter Ossorio - 1997 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27 (2&3):149–172.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Ku Koncepcii Možných Svetov Vo Wittgensteinovom Traktáte.Martin Schmidt - 1998 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (4):346-353.
Negative States of Affairs: Reinach Versus Ingarden.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2012 - Symposium. The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 16 (2):106-127.
Questions About States of Affairs.David M. Armstrong - 2009 - In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. pp. 30--39.
A World of Truthmakers.Philipp Keller - 2007 - In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. pp. 18--105.
D. M. Armstrong, "A World of States of Affairs".Donald W. Mertz - 1998 - Modern Schoolman 75 (3):227-235.
D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs. [REVIEW]C. Daly - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):640.


Added to PP index

Total views
51 ( #202,499 of 2,433,467 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #172,561 of 2,433,467 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes