Iterative and fixed point common belief

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):61-79 (1999)
Abstract
We define infinitary extensions to classical epistemic logic systems, and add also a common belief modality, axiomatized in a finitary, fixed-point manner. In the infinitary K system, common belief turns to be provably equivalent to the conjunction of all the finite levels of mutual belief. In contrast, in the infinitary monotonic system, common belief implies every transfinite level of mutual belief but is never implied by it. We conclude that the fixed-point notion of common belief is more powerful than the iterative notion of common belief
Keywords common knowledge  common belief  infinitary logic
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004357300525
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,220
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
A Quantitative Analysis of Modal Logic.Ronald Fagin - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (1):209-252.
La Connaissance Commune En Logique Modale.Luc Lismont - 1993 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 39 (1):115-130.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief.Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (1):49-52.
How Settled Are Settled Beliefs in “the Fixation of Belief”?Jeff Kasser - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):226-247.
Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
Infinitary Belief Revision.Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Does Belief Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - In Jelle Gerbrandy, Maarten Marx, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (eds.), Essays dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the occasion of his 50th birthday. Amsterdam University Press.
Fixing Perceptual Belief.Gerald Vision - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):292-314.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

24 ( #209,636 of 2,164,582 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #44,159 of 2,164,582 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums