Sophia:1-15 (forthcoming)

Authors
Santtu Heikkinen
University of Helsinki
Abstract
In this article, I explicate a new problem for a variant of panpsychism, strong experiential monism, that is the view that all being is experiential. I contrast the view with weak experiential monism, a softer variant that allows for non-experiential bare particulars to act as the carriers of properties. I argue that strong experiential monism can’t explain what works as the ontological commonality between the referents of one experience of something and another experience of that same thing; in other words, in virtue of what are those experiences about the same thing at all. If they aren’t about the same ontological existent at all, the apparent mutual coherence between these experiences requires explanation. I argue that strong experiential monism necessitates a more or less brute kind of parallelism between the experiences to explain their mutual coherence. Alternatively, the strong experiential monist must either retreat to weak experiential monism and non-experiential bare particulars or to a more robust kind of property dualism or dual-aspect monism.
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-022-00918-z
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References found in this work BETA

The Universe as We Find It.John Heil - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.David Chalmers - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. New York: Routledge. pp. 353-373.
The Analysis of Matter.Bertrand Russell - 1927 - London: Kegan Paul.
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.

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