Traces of things past

Philosophy of Science 45 (March):60-72 (1978)
This paper consists of two parts. In Part I, an attempt to get around certain well-known criticisms of the trace theory of memory is discussed. Part II consists of an account of the so-called "logical" notion of a memory trace. Trace theories are sometimes thought to be empirical hypotheses about the functioning of memory. That this is not the case, that trace theories are in fact philosophical theories, is shown, I believe, in the arguments which follow. If this is so, one may well wonder about psychologists' insistence that any empirical theory of memory must involve the postulation of traces (or trace-like entities: engrams, schemata, etc.)
Keywords Epistemology  Memory  Psychology  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288779
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,122
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Nature of Memory Traces.Felipe De Brigard - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (6):402-414.
Belief From the Past.Andrew Naylor - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):598-620.
Computation Without Representation.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
32 ( #164,548 of 2,191,302 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #291,146 of 2,191,302 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature