What Is Discrimination and When Is It Morally Wrong?
Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft Und Ethik 12 (1):97-114 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I propose to examine the concept of discrimination from an ethical viewpoint. In a preliminary part, I will point out which aspects of the subject matter I will focus on and which I will leave aside (II). On the basis of the Aristotelian principle “treat like cases alike”, I will continue with a very formal definition, according to which discrimination can be understood as acting in a way that implies that like cases are not treated alike. This leads to the difficult question of which cases are to be considered as “alike”, or which traits can serve as morally valid reasons for identifying cases as “unlike” (III). I will argue that this question cannot be answered independently from the specific circumstances and the normative premises referred to for describing these circumstances. My conclusion is that the concept of discrimination derives its “moral strength” solely from these normative premises. As a consequence, the use of the con- cept of discrimination can often be misleading since it falsely presupposes that there is agreement about the underlying normative premises (IV). Finally, I will illustrate the argumentation using “genetic discrimination” in connection with insurance contracts as an example (V).Author's Profile
DOI
10.1515/9783110192476.1.97
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Citations of this work
Discrimination in the age of artificial intelligence.Bert Heinrichs - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):143-154.
Stealing Bread and Sleeping Beneath Bridges - Indirect Discrimination as Disadvantageous Equal Treatment.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2015 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (2):299-327.
But Some Groups Are More Equal Than Others: A Critical Review of the Group-Criterion in the Concept of Discrimination.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (1):120-146.
Concept, principle, and norm—equality before the law reconsidered.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2018 - Legal Theory 24 (2):103-134.
Learning to Discriminate: The Perfect Proxy Problem in Artificially Intelligent Criminal Sentencing.Benjamin Davies & Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - In Jesper Ryberg & Julian V. Roberts (eds.), Sentencing and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.