Amodal Completion and Knowledge

Analysis:any063 (forthcoming)
Authors
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Grace Helton
Princeton University
Abstract
Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, i.e., it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion grounded knowledge are not safe, i.e., it is not the case that in all or nearly all near worlds where the relevant claim is believed true, that claim is in fact true. Thus, certain instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge refute both the view that knowledge is necessarily sensitive and the view that knowledge is necessarily safe.
Keywords amodal completion  knowledge  safety  sensitivity  epistemology  perceptual justification  epistemic justification
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any063
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References found in this work BETA

Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
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What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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