In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145 (2010)

Authors
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems from shared "qualia". Qualia are compatible with direct realism: while they generate an explanatory gap (and colors do not), so does /seeing/; qualia are excluded from perceptual consciousness by its "transparency"; instead, qualia are aspects of thought about the perceived environment. <br><br>The asymmetry between my treatments of color and seeing is grounded in the asymmetry between ignorance and error: while inversion shows that normal subjects are ignorant of the natures of the colors, hallucination shows not that perceivers are ignorant of the nature of seeing but that hallucinators are prone to error about their condition. Past literature has treated inversion and hallucination as on a par: externalists see error in both cases, while internalists see mutual ignorance. My account is so complicated because plausible results require mixing it up.
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.
There It Is.Benj Hellie - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164.

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