Carnap* replies

Authors
Geoffrey Hellman
University of Minnesota
Abstract
Despite my concerted efforts to formulate the linguistic doctrine of (first-order) logical truth, explicitly not as a claim that stipulations governing logical particles suffice to generate the logical truths (LD(I)), but as a determination thesis (LD(III))--that stipulations that certain particles behave as the classical logical particles suffice to determine uniquely the class of logically valid sentences, whose emptiness is clear and relatively unproblematic--, Quine2 nevertheless managed to read me as having claimed “that the logical truths can be generated (sic!) by stipulations--hence conventions--without the regress”! This was all the more disheartening as Quine had also written, in earlier correspondence,3 concerning my answer to the regress argument of Quine’s “Truth by Convention”: “I think it a good answer.” That answer turned on the point that neither the conventionalist nor anyone else need justify the logical truths--as empty, they require no justification--but rather that logical rules are needed, and perfectly in order, to justify of any logical truth that indeed it requires no justification in virtue of membership in the privileged class. Evidently, Quine must have changed his mind about this, for he disparages my notion of a “stipulated universal trait”, such as ‘being red or not red’, by rhetorically asking: “But how, without prior logic, do we then infer, in particular, that the Taj Mahal has the trait?” (P. 206.) We agree that inferences cannot be made without logic, but why..
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