Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55 (2009)

Authors
Bennett W. Helm
Franklin and Marshall College
Abstract
The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and so coming to see emotions as a distinctive and irreducible class of mental states lying at the intersection of intentionality, phenomenology, and motivation.
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DOI 10.1177/1754073909103593
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References found in this work BETA

Emotion.William Lyons - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert Morris Gordon - 1987 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Emotion.William Lyons - 1983 - Mind 92 (366):310-311.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hope: Conceptual and Normative Issues.Catherine Rioux - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3).
Hope as a Source of Grit.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Being Moved.Florian Cova & Julien Deonna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-20.
On the Appropriateness of Grief to Its Object.Matthew Ratcliffe, Louise Richardson & Becky Millar - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.

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