Factive phenomenal characters

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,429

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Díaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
Beyond Phenomenal Naivete.Benj Hellie - 2006 - Philosophers' Imprint 6:1-24.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given.Caleb Liang - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:21-36.
Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
Intellectual Gestalts.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 174.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
226 (#53,405)

6 months
7 (#108,138)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.

View all 118 references / Add more references