Factive phenomenal characters

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306 (2007)
Abstract
This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00128.x
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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