Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324 (2007)

Authors
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance"
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-0241-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,321
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental.Mark Textor - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
244 ( #36,360 of 2,419,779 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #87,713 of 2,419,779 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes