In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 333 (2004)

Authors
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
I argue on linguistic grounds that when Mary comes to know what it's like to see a red thing, she comes to know a certain inexpressible truth about the character of her own experience. This affords a "no concept" reply to the knowledge argument. The reason the Knowledge Argument has proven so intractable may be that we believe that an inexpressible concept and an expressible concept cannot have the same referent
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
What is It Like to Be a Bat.Thomas Nagel - 1974 - E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 5.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

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