Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument

In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 333 (2004)
Authors
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto, St. George
Abstract
I argue on linguistic grounds that when Mary comes to know what it's like to see a red thing, she comes to know a certain inexpressible truth about the character of her own experience. This affords a "no concept" reply to the knowledge argument. The reason the Knowledge Argument has proven so intractable may be that we believe that an inexpressible concept and an expressible concept cannot have the same referent
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,066
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.
Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
The Value of Knowledge.Shane Ryan - 2014 - Dialogue and Universalism 24 (3):84-88.
Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge.Alexander Paseau - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2):153-176.
Pleading Ignorance in Response to Experiential Primitivism.Raamy Majeed - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):251-269.
Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority?Mark McEvoy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):431-445.
How to Type: Reply to Halbach.Alexander Paseau - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):280-286.
Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. pp. 55--119.
Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
170 ( #32,250 of 2,241,631 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #233,375 of 2,241,631 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature