Jenann’s central metaphysical thesis is that there is an objective conditional probability function PrG(A/B), the domain of which includes a great many, perhaps all, pairs of contingent propositions. This pair can be synchronic or diachronic: both can concern how things are at the same time, or not. Jenann’s central epistemological thesis is antiskepticism about PrG, in the following sense: prima facie, the subjective credence functions of epistemically reasonable agents converge on PrG: roughly, if you’ve done a lot of science, for all A, B, your C(A/B) is similar to PrG(A/B). (Compare antiskepticism about perceptual knowledge: prima facie, if circumstances are good and one’s visual experience represents that p, p.) These theses have two cool consequences: ﬁrst, the possibility of a novel approach to objective Bayesianism; second, a way of doing away with dynamical laws
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Me, Again.Jenann Ismael - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press.
Symmetry as a Guide to Superfluous Theoretical Structure.Jenann Ismael & Bas C. van~Fraassen - 2003 - In Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Cambridge University Press. pp. 371--92.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #117,112 of 2,178,228 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #316,624 of 2,178,228 )
How can I increase my downloads?