European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66 (2007)

Authors
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
15 Hearing and Hallucinating Silence.Ian Phillips - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 333.
Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.

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