That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism

European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66 (2007)
Abstract
I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
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What Subjectivity Is Not.Joseph Neisser - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):41-53.
Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
15 Hearing and Hallucinating Silence.Ian Phillips - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 333.
Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.

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