Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264 (2018)

Authors
Grace Helton
Princeton University
Abstract
I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to as part of an argument that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally.
Keywords visual perception  social cognition  high-level perception  dual systems theory  action  intention  the contents of perception  perceptual closure principle  cognitive penetrability  delusion
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqx051
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References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can We Perceive Mental States?Eleonore Neufeld - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2245-2269.
Seeing Seeing.Ben Phillips - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):24-43.
How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
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Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
The Dominance of the Visual.Dustin Stokes & Stephen Biggs - 2014 - In D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press.

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