Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):301-316 (2009)

Abstract
Willful blindness is not an appropriate substitute for knowledge in crimes that require a mens rea of knowledge because an actor who contrives his own ignorance is only sometimes as culpable as a knowing actor. This paper begins with the assumption that the classic willfully blind actor—the drug courier—is culpable. If so, any plausible account of willful blindness must provide criteria that find this actor culpable. This paper then offers two limiting cases: a criminal defense lawyer defending a client he suspects of perjury and a pain doctor who suspects his patient may be lying about her pain. The paper argues that each of these actors is justified in cultivating ignorance about his client’s or patient’s truthfulness. If this is right, then a good theory of willful blindness must distinguish these cases. The article argues that neither Husak & Callender’s motivation-based account of willful blindness nor the recklessness account is able to do so. The paper proposes the following alternative: contrived ignorance constitutes culpable blindness when the decision to remain blind or to cultivate blindness is not itself justified. This Justification approach meshes with our intuitions about willfully blind drug couriers as well as willfully blind lawyers and doctors.
Keywords Willful blindness  Contrived ignorance  Culpable blindness  Justification
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DOI 10.1007/s11572-009-9080-y
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
Friendship and Belief.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):329-351.
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study.David Luban - 1988 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
Willful Ignorance in Law and Morality.Alexander Sarch - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (5):e12490.

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