Divine hiddenness or de jure objections to theism: You cannot have both

Analysis 81 (1):27-32 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


De facto objections to theism purport to show that theism is false, whereas de jure objections to theism claim that, whether or not theism is true, belief in God is irrational. Divine hiddenness – the fact that there are people who non-resistantly lack belief in God – is sometimes used as an argument against theism. In this article I will show that accepting the argument from divine hiddenness carries a high cost: it eliminates all de jure objections to theism. So atheists can either have de jure objections to theism or the objection from divine hiddenness, but they cannot have both.

Similar books and articles

Divine Hiddenness: New Essays.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Paul Moser - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Undermining the Axiological Solution to Divine Hiddenness.Perry Hendricks & Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 86 (1):3-15.
Divine Hiddenness: Defeated Evidence.Charity Anderson - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:119-132.
Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism.Stephen Maitzen - 2006 - Religious Studies 42 (2):177-191.
Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable Ignorance.Robert P. Lovering - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):89-107.
A Critical Evaluation of Rea’s Response to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness.Ross Parker - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):117--138.
Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (1):69-86.


Added to PP

480 (#20,940)

6 months
90 (#8,064)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Perry Hendricks
Purdue University