Deflating the Determination Argument

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):167-177 (2017)
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Abstract

This article argues for the compatibility of deflationism and truth-conditional semantic theories. I begin by focusing on an argument due to Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan for incompatibility, arguing that their argument relies on an ambiguity between two senses of the expression ‘is at least.’ I go on to show how the disambiguated arguments have different consequences for the deflationist, and argue that no conclusions are established that the deflationist cannot accommodate. I then respond to some objections and gesture at a more general defense of the compatibility claim.

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Jared Henderson
University of Connecticut

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References found in this work

Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Construction area (no hard hat required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.

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