Philosophia Naturalis 46 (2):251-278 (2009)

Boris Hennig
Ryerson University
The paper demonstrates that the biological species concept that Mayr con- trasts with the typological one in fact presupposes a version of the typological species concept. For one cannot assess whether two living beings are capable of producing offspring without already knowing what would count as off- spring. Therefore, one must know non-relational features of typical offspring of a kind of living beings in order to be able to apply the biological species concept. The typological species concept that is at stake here is the Aristote- lian one.
Keywords biological species  Aristotle  Mayr
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DOI 10.3196/003180209798439953
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Apprehending Human Form.Michael Thompson - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:47-74.
What is a Species, and What is Not?Ernst Mayr - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):262-277.

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