I. my concerns

Abstract

Actions are done for reasons. The reasons are beliefs and desires, which are physical states that causally interact in a rather special way. Their interaction exhibits a characteristic pattern: it is rational, at least in certain important respects.

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David Henderson
University of Warwick

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