Theory and Decision 73 (3):441-451 (2012)

This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account
Keywords Minimum cost spanning tree problems  Transferable utility games  Spillovers
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7
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