Ancient Philosophy 35 (2):303-316 (2015)

Boris Hennig
Ryerson University
We can accept Plato's "ingredient principle" when we replace the distinction between things and properties with a slightly different one.
Keywords Plato  Properties  Predication
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DOI 10.5840/ancientphil201535223
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