Practicing safe epistemology

Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258 (2001)
Abstract
Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically recognize other concepts of justification--typically subjective notions--which are given a noncompeting sort of epistemic legitimacy. However, they have tended to focus on the epistemically central notion of "strong justification," and have come to settle on this familiar reliablist analysis, supposing that it pretty much exhausts what there is to say about "objective justification.".
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010396124016
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Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack Lyons - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues.Sarah Wright - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112.
Justification in Context.Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (9):91-104.

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