Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):504-514 (2015)

Authors
Diana Heney
Vanderbilt University
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it
Keywords assertion  truth  reality
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2015112931
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Rascals, Triflers, and Pragmatists: Developing a Peircean Account of Assertion.Kenneth Boyd & Diana Heney - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):1-22.
Expressivism, Moral Judgment, and Disagreement: A Jamesian Program.Scott Aikin & Michael Hodges - 2018 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 32 (4):628-656.

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