Bioethics 33 (8):968-969 (2019)

Authors
Perry Hendricks
Purdue University
Abstract
In my article "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The impairment argument" (this journal), I defended what I called “The impairment argument” which purports to show that abortion is immoral. Bruce Blackshaw (2019) has argued that my argument fails on three accounts. In this article, I respond to his criticisms.
Keywords abortion  the impairment argument
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DOI 10.1111/bioe.12644
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Strengthening the Impairment Argument Against Abortion.Bruce Philip Blackshaw & Perry Hendricks - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 1 (Online):medethics-2020-106153.

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