Russellian Monism: The Heritage of Russell’s Construction of Matter from Experience – Review of Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism

Constructivist Foundations 12 (1):126-129 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Upshot: The central issue of Consciousness in the Physical World is Russellian monism, which claims that consciousness could be ontologically reduced to intrinsic properties of physical objects. In contemporary discussions, Russellian monism is more broadly defined than Russell’s original version of neutral monism, and it even becomes a family of views. In this review, based on two major distinctions between Russellian monism and Russell’s neutral monism, we point out that these current re-interpretations not only extend Russell’s theory; some may also put a heavy metaphysical burden on Russell’s construction of matter from experience.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Russell on Russellian Monism.Donovan Wishon - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 91-118.
A Physicalist Critique of Russellian Monism.Alyssa Ney - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 346-369.
Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-11-15

Downloads
60 (#274,950)

6 months
8 (#415,703)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references