History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):15-28 (2010)

Boris Hennig
Ryerson University
Descartes’ metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness (conscientia) belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, ‘consciousness’ refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be doing, and of the possibility of a gap between the two
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DOI 10.1177/0952695110363353
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References found in this work BETA

Essais. Zürich.M. De Montaigne - forthcoming - Diogenes.
Descartes and Augustine.Stephen Menn - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Descartes and Augustine.Stephen Menn - 1998 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (4):455-457.
Descartes on `Thought'.John Cottingham - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (112):208-214.

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Resisting Neurosciences and Sustaining History.Roger Smith - 2019 - History of the Human Sciences 32 (1):9-22.

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