The man without properties

Synthese 194 (6) (2017)
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Contemporary philosophical logic rests on a distinction between things and properties. Properties are thought to differ from things in that their proper expression is incomplete or unsaturated. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle did not distinguish between things and properties in this way. I will show, first, that Aristotle’s essences are not properties, and that certain passages in Aristotle make sense only if we do not take accidents to be properties either. The notion of a property is thus not fundamental in Aristotle’s theory of predication. Aristotle’s predicate terms do not stand for properties but for non-substantial things. Second, I will explain and explore the distinction between substances and non-substantial things. This will yield a viable alternative to our contemporary, Fregean account of predication



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Boris Hennig
Ryerson University

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References found in this work

Many-one identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (3):193-216.
The logic of natural language.Fred Sommers - 1982 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Essays in ancient philosophy.Michael Frede (ed.) - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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