The Monist 103 (3):278-293 (2020)

Abstract
I argue that we do not intentionally and rationally shape our character and values in major ways. I base this argument on the nature of transformative experiences, that is, those experiences which are transformative from personal and epistemological points of view. The argument is roughly this. First, someone who undergoes major changes in her character or values thereby undergoes a transformative experience. Second, if she undergoes such an experience, her reasons for changing in a major way are inaccessible to her beforehand. Third, if such reasons are inaccessible beforehand, she cannot act on them and thus cannot rationally and intentionally shape her character or values. I also explore some consequences of my argument, especially those related to control and responsibility.
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DOI 10.1093/monist/onaa004
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.

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