Synthese 145 (1):45-63 (2005)
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Abstract |
Donald Davidsons classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidsons argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility.
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Keywords | Event Metaphysics Physicalism Reduction Transcendental Argument Davidson, Donald |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11229-004-5866-6 |
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References found in this work BETA
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Library of Living Philosophers).Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.) - 1999 - Open Court.
Rationality and the Argument for Anomalous Monism.Steven Yalowitz - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (3):235-258.
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