Defending the Right To Do Wrong

Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Human rights and human well-being.William Talbott - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Collective Rights and Minority Rights.Seumas Miller - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):241-257.
The moral foundation of rights.L. W. Sumner - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The nature and disvalue of injury.Seth Lazar - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (3):289-304.
Wrong Rights.Elizabeth Wolgast - 1987 - Hypatia 2 (1):25 - 43.
Intentions, Rights and Wrongs.Marilyn Fischer - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:239-247.
The Nature of Rights.Louis G. Lombardi - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:431-439.
A Theological Approach to Moral Rights.Joseph L. Allen - 1974 - Journal of Religious Ethics 2 (1):119 - 141.
Moral Rights and Human Culture.Lisa Bortolotti - 2006 - Ethical Perspectives 13 (4):603-620.
Human Rights and Concept of Person.Barbara de Mori - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):159-169.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-01-01

Downloads
243 (#78,826)

6 months
15 (#133,312)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ori Herstein
King's College London

Citations of this work

From rights to prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
Rights.Leif Wenar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong.Renee Jorgensen Bolinger - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):43-57.
Transcending the Means Principle.Alec Walen - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (4):427-464.
Privacy and the Importance of ‘Getting Away With It’.Cressida Gaukroger - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):416-439.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A right to do wrong.Jeremy Waldron - 1981 - Ethics 92 (1):21-39.
Theories of rights.Alon Harel - 2004 - In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 191–206.
The right to do wrong.Gerhard Øverland - 2007 - Law and Philosophy 26 (4):377-404.

Add more references