Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235 (2008)
Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
|Keywords||The Nature of Folk Psychology Theory of Mind, Misc|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons.Daniel D. Hutto - 2007 - Bradford.
Citations of this work BETA
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds.Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):187-212.
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