Impossibility Results for Infinite-Electorate Abstract Aggregation Rules

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):273-286 (2012)

Abstract
Following Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995), this paper explores in a model-theoretic framework the relation between Arrovian aggregation rules and ultraproducts, in order to investigate a source of impossibility results for the case of an infinite number of individuals and an aggregation rule based on a free ultrafilter of decisive coalitions.
Keywords Arrow-type preference aggregation  Judgment aggregation  Model theory  First-order predicate logic  Filter  Ultrafilter  Reduced product  Ultraproduct  Existential quantifier
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-011-9203-5
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References found in this work BETA

Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Judgment Aggregation: A Survey.Christian List & Clemens Puppe - 2009 - In Christian List & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):562-582.

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Aggregating Infinitely Many Probability Measures.Frederik Herzberg - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (2):319-337.
Infinite Populations, Choice and Determinacy.Tadeusz Litak - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (5):969-999.

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