Is there life after the death of the computational theory of mind?

Minds and Machines 15 (2):183-194 (2005)
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In this paper, I explore the implications of Fodor’s attacks on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which get their most recent airing in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way. I argue that if Fodor is right that the CTM founders on the global nature of abductive inference, then several of the philosophical views about the mind that he has championed over the years founder as well. I focus on Fodor’s accounts of mental causation, psychological explanation, and intentionality



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Jeffrey Hershfield
Wichita State University

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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