Minds and Machines 15 (2):183-194 (2005)
In this paper, I explore the implications of Fodor’s attacks on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which get their most recent airing in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way. I argue that if Fodor is right that the CTM founders on the global nature of abductive inference, then several of the philosophical views about the mind that he has championed over the years founder as well. I focus on Fodor’s accounts of mental causation, psychological explanation, and intentionality
|Keywords||Abduction Computation Explanation Inference Metaphysics Mind Fodor, Jerry|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Review of Jerry Fodor, the Mind DoesnT Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. [REVIEW]John Sutton - 2001 - Metapsychology 5 (7).
On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Josh Weisberg - manuscript
What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity.Robert A. Wilson - 2008 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. pp. 407-425.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads92 ( #55,395 of 2,158,671 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #354,589 of 2,158,671 )
How can I increase my downloads?