Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38 (1998)

Authors
Jeffrey Hershfield
Wichita State University
Abstract
The subjectivity of the mental consists in the idea that there are features of our mental states that are perspectival in that they are accessible only from the first-person point of view. This is held to be a problem for materialist theories of mind, since such theories contend that there is nothing about the mind that cannot be fully described from a third-person point of view. Lycan suggests a notion of “phenomenal information” that is held to be perspectival in the relevant sense but also perfectly objective, since it is explicated in terms of the computational roles of higher-order mental representations. I argue that his project fails because phenomenal information is accessible to observers, and hence it fails to be perspectival in the required sense. That sense demands that there be aspects of our conscious experiences that cannot be intersubjectively compared
Keywords Mental  Ontology  Science  Subjectivity  Lycan, W
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089808573257
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,955
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
What Mary Didn’T Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.
Emerging Selves: Representational Foundations of Subjectivity.Wolfgang Prinz - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):515-528.
Ontological Subjectivity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 175 (2):175-200.
Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.
Subjectivity.Norman Malcolm - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (April):147-60.
Bat or Batman?David Pugmire - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (April):207-17.
Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.
Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: A Reply to Lycan.Charles Siewert - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
Why There Are No Mental Representations.M. Morris - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):1-30.
Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness.René Jagnow - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
The Perils of Subjectivity.Charles Taliaferro - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):475-480.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
42 ( #238,083 of 2,403,201 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #552,147 of 2,403,201 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes