Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38 (1998)
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Abstract |
The subjectivity of the mental consists in the idea that there are features of our mental states that are perspectival in that they are accessible only from the first-person point of view. This is held to be a problem for materialist theories of mind, since such theories contend that there is nothing about the mind that cannot be fully described from a third-person point of view. Lycan suggests a notion of “phenomenal information” that is held to be perspectival in the relevant sense but also perfectly objective, since it is explicated in terms of the computational roles of higher-order mental representations. I argue that his project fails because phenomenal information is accessible to observers, and hence it fails to be perspectival in the required sense. That sense demands that there be aspects of our conscious experiences that cannot be intersubjectively compared
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Keywords | Mental Ontology Science Subjectivity Lycan, W |
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DOI | 10.1080/09515089808573257 |
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Phenomenal Information Again: It is Both Real and Intrinsically Perspectival.William G. Lycan - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):239-42.
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