Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth

Philosophia 40 (2):357-363 (2012)
Authors
Jeffrey Hershfield
Wichita State University
Abstract
A principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the value of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot adequately accommodate the complex role that truth plays in the norms governing assertion and similar speech acts.
Keywords Truth  Deflationary theory  Austin, J. L.  Horwich, Paul  Dummett, Michael  Speech acts
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9336-3
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

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